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Differentiated Integration in the European Union 
European integration has never been a ‘uniform’ process, with one set of rules applying 
equally to all Member States. Instead, from Rome (1958) to Lisbon (2009), the treaties 
establishing the European Union (EU) and its predecessors have all contained 
exceptions from common provisions. The literature refers to this phenomenon as 
differentiated integration (DI). While DI has always been a feature of European 
integration, the absolute number of exceptions in EU treaties and secondary law has 
increased over time (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2020a). The Lisbon Treaty, for 
example, is considered a milestone for DI (Koller 2012; Brunazzo 2019). As such, the 
EU has become an increasingly differentiated political system in recent years (Leuffen 
et al. 2013; Dyson and Sepos 2010). 
Despite this, there is surprisingly little research about the attitudes of political actors 
– such as governments – towards DI. Five contributions in this special issue investigate 
this gap in the literature. Putting a focus on smaller and less studied EU Member 
States, they develop in-depth case studies of Austria, Finland, Portugal, Romania, and 
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Slovenia. For better comparability, these papers follow a common approach (see 
below). In addition, the special issue contains a thematic contribution which explores 
whether the EU’s differentiated Banking Union will ultimately converge in uniform 
integration or see further differentiation. 
Theory and conceptualization  
Five contributions in this special issue follow a joint approach2 in exploring how much 
governments debate differentiated integration and about the way they view it. The 
approach conceptually distinguishes between policy differentiation, polity 
differentiation, and mechanisms of differentiation. This conceptualization 
disentangles previously conflated dimensions of DI and helps to generate a clearer 
understanding of what drives differentiation in the EU. 
Policy Differentiation 
Policy differentiation refers to the differentiated participation of Member States in 
specific EU policies, such as the Eurozone or the Schengen Area. The literature 
explaining policy differentiation distinguishes between demand-side and supply-side 
factors (Leuffen, Rittberger, and Schimmelfennig 2013; Schimmelfennig and Winzen 
2020b). On the demand-side, DI is seen as rooted in the heterogeneity of the Member 
States with regard both to their integration preferences and their integration capacity. 
Repeated EU enlargements and treaty revisions are seen as the main sources of 
increasing heterogeneity in the EU. On the supply-side, EU decision rules are crucial. 
The combination of increasingly diverse Member States and demanding decision rules 
can lead to decision-making gridlock. By exempting or excluding Member States from 
participation in common policies, differentiated integration offers a way to increase 
decision-making effectiveness. In addition, differentiated integration can serve to 
accommodate the concerns of reluctant Member States and to protect the quality of 
common policies. In short, by allowing reluctant and underprepared Member States to 
refrain from cooperation temporarily or permanently, the willing and able Member 
States can deepen their cooperation in specific policy fields. The result is that not all 
Member States participate in all EU policies at the same time or to the same extent, 
hence policy differentiation. 
Polity Differentiation 
We distinguish policy differentiation from polity differentiation. Polity differentiation 
refers to the nature and functioning of a differentiated EU as a whole. This perspective 
builds on Alexander Stubb’s (1996) influential categorization of differentiated 
integration in terms of space, matter, and time. Differentiation always involves the 
dimensions of space (Member States) and matter (policies). Depending on whether 
membership in various policy regimes is overlapping or not, polity differentiation can 
take two different shapes: In the first scenario, the EU would comprise a deeply 
integrated core surrounded by ‘concentric circles’ of less integrated Member States. In 
the second scenario, the EU would consist of multiple policy regimes with partially 
overlapping membership, a ‘Europe à la carte’. 
 
2 This framework was developed for the Horizon 2020 project InDivEU on differentiated integration in the EU. 
More information and project outputs are available here: http://indiveu.eui.eu/integrated-database/  
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Moreover, differentiation can be either temporary or permanent. Temporary 
differentiation means that while not all Member States participate in all EU policies at 
the same time, all will ultimately reach the same level of deep cooperation. While 
temporary differentiation is compatible with the idea of an ‘ever closer Union’, 
permanent differentiation is not. Hence, the former type of polity differentiation would 
result in a ‘multi-speed Europe’, while the latter would produce a ‘Europe of multiple 
end points’. 
Polity differentiation is an outcome of policy differentiation. However, the policy and 
polity objectives of Member States may not always overlap. While policy differentiation 
can achieve immediate policy objectives, the accumulated effect of these exceptions 
may undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU as a whole. Conversely, 
Member States may also seek to protect the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU 
polity by excluding unprepared Member States from common policies. Finally, due to 
domestic electoral pressures, Member States may pursue exceptions from EU rules 
even if they worry about a loss of influence in a differentiated EU. In short, due to ill-
aligned national objectives, capacity concerns, and time inconsistencies, Member 
States are likely to engage in more policy differentiation than their polity preferences 
regarding the functioning of the EU would suggest. To the extent that this is the case, 
polity differentiation can be thought of as an unintended consequence of policy 
differentiation. 
Mechanisms of Differentiation 
In practical terms, DI can be realized via a variety of  legal mechanisms (De Witte 2018, 
2019). The most common of these are ‘opt-outs’ from common policies and ‘enhanced 
cooperation’. Opt-outs can be distinguished as voluntary exemptions or discriminatory 
exclusions from community rules (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014). Voluntary opt-
outs are seen as rooted in Member State preferences and usually occur in the context 
of EU treaty change (deepening integration). Discriminatory opt-outs are rooted in 
concerns about the capacity of a Member State to implement a common policy. They 
usually occur in the context of EU enlargements (widening integration). But 
Differentiation also results from demand for more integration. Such ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ allows Member States to pursue deeper integration in a small avant-garde 
group, usually requiring the consent of the non-participating states, while also 
generating a certain pressure for ‘laggard’ states to catch up. 
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Methodologically, authors in this special issue analyse key documents in the period 




translated into the relevant national languages. The salience of DI is assessed by 
counting the frequency of references to DI keywords in parliamentary debates, 
assuming that more debated issues are politically more relevant. To assess 
governmental positions on differentiated integration, the authors code mentions of DI 
keywords which were made by members of the government/governing parties in 
parliamentary debates. To capture indirect references to DI, the authors also read 
government programs and key speeches by Prime Ministers/Presidents at the national 
and European level.  
Key findings of the Special Issue 
The first five contributions of this special issue look at several smaller and less studied 
EU Member States. Specifically, these contributions assess the salience of DI in the 
political debates, as well as the positions of governmental actors on this topic over the 
period 2004 and 2019. 
Looking at the Austrian case, Katrin Auel shows that, overall, DI has not been a salient 
issue in this country – at least with regard to general concepts and models. While the 
political actors have often debated policy integration, the general implications of DI, 
particularly for the EU polity, were largely absent from political debates. In Austria, 
the fairly critical attitudes of citizens towards the EU did not translate into political 
attempts to obtain opt-outs from EU policies. 
The pattern was similar in Finland. Saila Heinikoski clearly shows that Finland has 
discussed DI mainly with regard to approving specific instances of differentiation, such 
as the Prüm Convention or the adoption of the PESCO. In contrast to its Scandinavian 
neighbours, which have opted for non-participation in certain key EU policies, Finnish 
governments seek to participate in all EU initiatives. Nevertheless, there has been little 
debate in Finland about DI’s systemic consequences for EU integration.  
In Portugal, as Frederico Ferreira da Silva shows, the salience of differentiated 
integration was generally low. However, it was enhanced during the euro crisis, when 
domestic and European politics intersected. The position of Portuguese governments 
regarding DI during the period analysed was overwhelmingly negative. In general, this 
stance was also shared by the opposition parties: DI models were considered to be 
against both the European and the national interest. Specifically, there was concern 
that DI may push Portugal into an even more peripheral position. However, the 
enhanced co-operation mechanism was seen in a generally positive manner, 
recognising its potential to promote advances in European integration when the EU 
faced gridlock. 
The case of Romania, presented by Claudia Badulescu, shows how DI is perceived in a 
country which is involuntarily excluded from both the Schengen Area and the 
Eurozone. In the period considered, a relatively low salience of DI models and DI 
mechanisms was evident, though the salience of Schengen and the Eurozone was high. 
Notably, all Romanian governments have shown strong opposition to DI for fear of 
being left behind in a ‘second-tier’ Europe. 
The analysis of the Slovenian case by Maja Bučar and Boštjan Udovič shows that the 
keywords associated with the salience of DI are seldom used in parliamentary debates, 
coalition programmes or prime ministerial speeches. In Slovenia, the issue of DI is 
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more a topic in academic discussion than in daily politics. Slovenian politicians 
perceive a strong and united EU as a factor of key importance for the country, and fear 
that a multi-tier EU would mean fewer opportunities for smaller and/or less developed 
countries. 
Finally, the article on the European Banking Union (EBU) written by Eva Hanada 
concludes this special issue of ANZJES. This is an original topic (EBU was only recently 
adopted) and rarely considered in the literature on DI. The research shows that some 
non-Euro countries look at EBU opt-in as the first step toward the adoption of the 
common currency, while others prefer to protect their national sovereignty in financial 
supervision. 
Concluding remarks: Beware of unintended consequences 
This ANZJES special issue seeks to complement the literature on DI by looking at the 
national debates on this topic in some of the smaller EU Member States and in the 
recent decision concerning the adoption of EBU. While, on the one side, DI typologies, 
mechanisms and rationale have been the focus of a significant amount of research, on 
the other side the literature on government positions and, more generally, political 
debates about DI are far more limited.  
The first five articles clearly demonstrate that DI is not a salient issue in the smaller 
Member States analysed. While DI has definitely entered onto the EU’s political 
agenda, as the 2017 White Paper on the Future of Europe clearly illustrates, it received 
less attention at the Member State level. This is especially true for polity 
differentiation. Indeed, when national government and parliaments did discuss DI, the 
focus was predominantly on specific policies. This confirms the notion that the 
member states primarily view DI as a means to achieve policy objectives. At the policy 
level, the formation of Member State preferences was strongly influenced by existing 
or expected European interdependencies. Moreover, in some countries, the opposition 
parties instrumentally used DI to question the EU policy of the government, thus 
politicising the topic. Finally, the policy-focus of the Member States also means that 
they are paying little attention to the potential long-term effects of DI on the nature 
and functioning of the EU. Arguably, this myopia increases the chances that DI may 
have unintended negative consequences for the integration process in the long run. 
It remains to be seen if differentiated integration will receive more prominent attention 
in national political debates in the future. Regardless, political actors would do well to 
consider some of the following questions regarding the impact of DI on the nature and 
functioning of the EU: how much differentiation is possible without putting at risk the 
sustainability of the integration process? Where does differentiation end and 
disintegration begin? Does DI increase the complexity of the EU and exacerbate its 
democratic deficit? And, finally, is the future of the EU inevitably more differentiated? 
Of course, there remains much food for thought and research for several other special 
issues. 
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